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The Seville Council has had a somewhat mixed reception. True to form, The Economist derided it as “a non-event”, and
described it  as being “among the sleepiest” EU summits in living memory. Other observers, however, claimed genuine
progress had been made in the three areas which dominated the Seville agenda, namely immigration, enlargement, and
institutional reform. In Spain itself, the socialist and communist opposition parties, which had assisted the trade unions in
staging the first general strike endured by José María Aznar since coming to office in 1996 on the eve of the summit, were
quick to read its shortcomings as evidence of his growing isolation and loss of influence in Europe. As expected, this did not
prevent the Spanish prime minister from informing the European Parliament that he was “reasonably satisfied” with the
outcome of the Seville Council and of the Spanish presidency as a whole.
In the run-up to the summit it  was undoubtedly the decisions relating to the EU’s asylum and immigration policy that
attracted most attention, though media coverage of this proved somewhat misleading. Immigration has been a major EU
concern since the Tampere Council of 1999 laid down the foundations of a future area of freedom, security and justice, but
Commission initiatives in this field –particularly Commissioner Antonio Vitorino’s seminal Green Paper- had been resisted
fiercely by some member states, notably Germany and Austria. Precisely because of this, the presidency’s programme
dedicated special attention to the fulfilment of Tampere, and announced that “Spain will place special emphasis on moving
ahead  in  those  matters  which  have  made  least  progress,  such  as  the  creation  of  a  common  policy  on  asylum and
immigration”.
In the wake of elections in France and the Netherlands earlier this year, and given the fears they unleashed of a xenophobic
back-lash in Europe, the Spanish presidency rightly felt that public opinion expected the EU to address the immigration
question in earnest. According to recent Commission estimates, in addition to fifteen million legal immigrants, there are
currently some three million illegal ones in the EU, with a further half million entering every year. Furthermore, the latest
Eurobarometers show that 80% of those polled consider that the fight against illegal immigration should rank very high in
the EU’s list of priorities. Additionally, the presidency could not ignore growing concern about crime and personal security
in many member states, including Germany, where these issues were already dominating public debate in the run-up to the
September elections. Finally, by placing the immigration question firmly on the Seville agenda, Aznar was also responding
to pressure from the Commission, whose president, Romano Prodi, had written to remind him that failure to tackle illegal
immigration would undermine the EU’s ability to ensure “the harmonious integration of our existing immigrant population”.
In his letter, Prodi recognised that legal immigration “is a source of vitality and energy which an ageing Europe needs”,
adding that “the multicultural nature of our societies is now a reality and we must be willing to embrace all the adjustments
necessary to make multiculturalism and ethnic diversity succeed”, an important statement of principle which went largely
unnoticed. Fully in keeping with this philosophy, the Seville presidency conclusions duly recorded that “the integration of
immigrants lawfully present in the Union entails both rights and obligations in relation to the fundamental rights recognised
within the Union”, acknowledging that, in this regard, “combating racism and xenophobia is of essential importance”. 
At Seville, the EU’s heads of state and government had no trouble in agreeing to a number of measures aimed at fighting
illegal immigration, including a common repatriation programme and the conclusion of readmission agreements with certain
countries. Some member states, including France, had expressed support for the Aznar-Blair-Berlusconi plan to create a
European Border Police, but this had to be dropped in the face of stiff opposition from Sweden and Finland in particular.
Instead, the Council agreed to the gradual introduction of measures leading to a co-ordinated, integrated management of the
EU’s external borders, including joint operations before the end of 2002.  
Most  controversial of  all,  however,  was the  question of  whether and how to link immigration policy to development
co-operation with third countries. In the weeks prior to the Council, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder had advocated the
possibility of imposing sanctions on countries which proved uncooperative, a position also favoured by Aznar, but strongly
resisted by France’s recently re-elected president, Jacques Chirac, who was determined not to have his relations with the
Magreb states conditioned by EU policy. In the event, however, Blair’s position was undermined from within by members
of his own government such as the secretary of state for International Development, Clare Short, and Schröder did not
fancy a confrontation with France and Sweden over this issue either, in view of which Aznar also relented. The Council
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finally accepted that all future agreements with third countries will include a clause on joint management of migration flows
and on compulsory readmission of illegal immigrants, and committed itself to a systematic assessment of relations with
countries that are uncooperative. In theory, member states could agree to penalise these countries, but the decision would
have  to be  unanimous,  and would in any case  not  be  allowed to jeopardise  development  co-operation objectives.  In
practice, therefore, it  is difficult  to see how these sanctions will go beyond the strictly political level.  In addition, the
Council also agreed to accelerate the definition of a common asylum policy, which should be ready by late 2003, and
without which it would be impossible to create an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU.
The debate  over  how to finance  the  forthcoming enlargement  of  the  EU also put  in  an appearance  at  Seville,  albeit
informally. Under the Spanish presidency, ninety-six negotiating chapters were tackled, but some serious questions remain
unanswered. These mainly concerned the volume of the total budget available to finance enlargement during the period
2004-2006, the size of contributions to be made by the future members to the Community budget, and, most importantly,
the  question  of  direct  aid  to farmers under  the  Common Agricultural Policy.  The  EU is  telling farmers in  candidate
countries that in 2004 they will get only 25% of the level of direct payments currently available to their EU counterparts,
gradually rising to 100% over a ten-year period. This is denounced by the applicants as unfair, but some member states,
notably Germany, Britain and the Netherlands, would like to do away with direct payments altogether, and Schröder has
already warned that he will not support a common position on direct aid to agriculture unless the future thrust of CAP
reform is clarified beforehand. Not much progress can therefore be expected on this front until after the German elections
due in September, and the final decision on the financial package will have to be taken by early November at the latest if
the Copenhagen Council due in December is to complete negotiations with the ten candidate countries as intended. In
effect, this means the Danish presidency will have to take full advantage of a rather narrow window of opportunity if it is to
succeed in finding a settlement acceptable to the EU-fifteen first, and selling it to the candidate countries, later. All of this
simply goes to prove, as the Iberian and EFTA precedents taught us with a vengeance, that the key to enlargement is not
the negotiation with candidate countries, but rather the deal that needs to be struck amongst existing members over the cost
of admitting new ones. 
The prospect of enlargement is at least having a positive impact on member states’ willingness to contemplate long-overdue
institutional reforms. In this as in other fields, however, the Spanish presidency did not quite achieve its goals, largely on
account of determined French opposition. As far as the European Council is concerned, the heads of state and government
agreed  that  in  future  this  body  will  meet  four  times  a  year,  for  gatherings  which  will  last  only  one  full  day.  More
importantly, in December 2002 the European Council will adopt an annual operating programme covering two presidencies,
and in December 2003 it will agree to a three-year strategic programme. This was in fact an indirect way of beginning to
deal with the complex question of the six-monthly rotating presidency, and implicitly, the so-called ‘presidency of the
Union’ debate as well, matters which will be addressed in greater depth at Copenhagen.
Aznar and Javier Solana (in his capacity as secretary general of the Council) went to Seville with something far more
revolutionary in mind, namely the introduction of majority voting in the European Council, but Chirac adamantly opposed
this, presumably out of fear of being overruled in future over CAP reform. The Spanish tandem had also intended to split
the General Affairs Council into two bodies, one of them dealing with horizontal issues and the preparation of summits, the
other with all external matters, including CFSP, ESDP, foreign trade, development co-operation and humanitarian aid. On
this occasion, however, it was smaller states such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Ireland who stymied
their efforts. As a result, the Seville Council opted for a somewhat bizarre formula, namely the creation of a supposedly
new General Affairs and External Relations Council, which will be able to hold separate meetings, with different agendas
and possibly on different dates, to discuss the two types of issues mentioned above. This curious compromise solution is
largely attributable to the opposition of certain Foreign Affairs ministers who are determined not to share their virtual
monopoly  of  EU affairs  with  other  government  departments,  an  attitude  that  threatens to  render  this  reform largely
meaningless.
On a more constructive note, with a view to improving the functioning of the Council in the run-up to enlargement, at
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Seville European leaders agreed to reduce the total number of Council configurations from sixteen to nine. Although some
critics argue that this reform is merely cosmetic, others are hopeful that it will lead to a more rational conduct of business.
Thus, having a single council responsible for competitiveness (grouping internal market, industry and research) is fully in
keeping with  the  Lisbon agenda,  and  bringing development  co-operation under  the  realm of  the  General Affairs and
External Relations Council may result in a more coherent policy process. In the institutional field, however, the Seville
summit will probably be remembered for its decision to open Council meetings to the public when the latter is acting in
accordance with the procedure for co-decision with the European Parliament. Having allowed their citizens to witness the
Commission’s presentation of proposals and the ensuing debate, and also the final vote and the explanations of that vote by
national  officials,  in  future  governments  will  find  it  increasingly  difficult  to  blame  ‘Brussels’  for  the  EU’s  alleged
democratic deficit.
Although they  enjoyed  far  less  prominence  on  the  Council’s  agenda  than  some  of  the  matters  discussed  above,  the
economic issues raised at Seville were of no little importance. The fact that it took the Ecofin meeting on 21 June over six
hours to adopt the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for 2002 was a good indication of the difficulties involved. As
expected, the Council agreed that 2004 should remain the date by which to achieve a level “close to a balanced position” in
countries with budget deficits, meaning that these should not exceed 0.5% of GDP by then. However, the new French
government, which had recently revealed that its public deficit could reach 2.5% of GDP this year, instead of the 1.9%
originally forecast, made it clear that it would only accept this goal if the French economy grew by 3% in 2003 and 2004. In
a similar vein, Edmund Stoiber, who may well succeed Schröder after the September elections, warned that if he wins he
would probably not be able to present a balanced budget until 2006. In short, the tension between member states favouring
a flexible interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact (a list which now includes Portugal, Italy and Britain as well as
France and Germany) and those insisting on a stricter reading of the same, which was already evident at the Barcelona
Council,  remains  unresolved  and  will  probably  continue  to  grow  in  the  months  ahead,  with  potentially  serious
consequences.
In sum, the  Seville  Council may not  go down in EU history for the  specific  measures it  adopted,  but  it  undoubtedly
succeeded in forcing European leaders and public opinion alike to take stock of the challenges that lie ahead. In years to
come, some will no doubt remember Seville as the birth place of ‘fortress Europe’, but many more will hopefully link it to
the long-overdue and somewhat hesitant launching of the EU’s common asylum and immigration policy. In Spain itself, it
will be difficult not to associate this summit with the general strike that preceded it, and more generally, with a growing
politicisation of the European debate. The underlying lesson is perhaps obvious, but nevertheless important: as the process
of European integration advances, the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign policy is being rapidly eroded,
and citizens and their representatives are exercising their right to question and debate their governments’ European policies
with ever greater vigour and familiarity. And familiarity, as everyone knows, inevitably breeds contempt.
The Elcano Royal  Institute  does not  necessarily  share  the  views expressed by  the  authors of  its
Working  Papers  and  other  texts  which  may  appear  on  its  Website  or  in  any  other  of  its
publications.The Institute’s primary goal is to act as a leading forum for research and analysis and to
stimulate informed discussion of international affairs, particularly with regard to those issues which are
most relevant from a Spanish perspective, and which will  be of interest to policy-makers, business
leaders, the media, and society at large.
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